The large national banks in New York dominated the call loan market for much of the national banking era. The considerable size of the call loan market meant that the large New York City banks inevitably had a substantial proportion of their assets in call loans. Hence, the banks had a great incentive to maintain the market's liquidity and stability. But their influence began to wane in the 1890s as outside intermediaries increased their lending in the call loan market. By 1907 trust companies along with interior and foreign banks had become serious rivals to the New York banks on the call loan market.
The New York Clearing House banks had the incentive to monitor the solvency and liquidity of its member banks to ensure that the liquidity of the call loan market was preserved. As intermediaries outside the Clearing House gained direct access to the call loan market, the ability of the New York banks to monitor the call loan market began to break down. The trust companies and interior banks that issued loans on call were essentially free riding on the insurance provided by the Clearing House member banks.
These outside participants in the call loan market were not concerned with the long-term viability of the market -that is, they acted as if their actions individually were unimportant.
We view the efforts of the bankers to maintain the call loan market as an example of an implicit insurance contract, a twofold contract between the stockbrokers and the bankers, as well as one between the bankers themselves. The insurance argument describes fairly well the interactions between the bankers during 19 th century panics through the New York Clearing House, combined with intentional lack of actionnamely, forbearance on calling in loans --between bankers and brokers during panics.
The relatively greater exposure to the call market of the large New York banks made them the "monitors" for systemic withdrawals from the call market. If interior banks liquidated their call loans to retrieve reserves to meet depositor withdrawals during a panic, the resulting contraction in call loan liquidity would either force New York banks to: a) take over the loans, or b) risk the possibility that the borrower would have to sell the collateral on the market during a panic to pay the loan. A firesale of call loans during a panic would threaten a downward spiral in stock prices, deepening the crisis.
The extension of additional call loans by the Clearing House banks was likely motivated by their perceptions of market illiquidity, and their full recognition of their extensive exposure to the call market.
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I. The Call Loan Market
The call loan market was one source of funds for margin borrowing on the New York stock market. Call loans were potentially demandable or callable on notice within the day. Call loans were typically not called after 12:15pm, but that was by custom rather than as a rule. The implicit term of the loan was overnight, but 95 percent of loans were renewed or rolled over. The call loan rate in New York City was a competitive market rate on new loans, and the renewal rate was the average of loan rates observed on that day. The borrower could sell the collateral and seek to substitute another stock for the liquidated collateral in order to maintain the loan. All such substitutions were subject to 1 The withdrawal of funds from the call market by these other institutions is analogous to the movement of "hot money" during the Asian Crisis in 1997. The portfolio managers shifted the placement of funds toward the areas of highest return rather than being concerned with the long-run viability of the Asian financial markets. Separately, the liquidation of assets in the Asian markets could also have been motivated by exogenous liquidity demands arising from outside the respective countries. The combination of these events put enormous pressure on the developing Asian financial markets. The same analysis applies to the failure of the overnight repurchase agreement market in 2007-2008. the approval of the lender, and all lending was to be transacted through a broker.
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Call loans typically were made for 80 percent of the collateral presented, and the lender held the collateral, usually the stock certificates purchased with the loan, akin to the current method of purchasing stock on margin. Call loans in New York City also had particular legal covenants that essentially gave all power to the lender in the event the borrower breached any of the contract terms. 3 For example, the lender could, upon breach of contract, sell the collateral with the borrower still being liable for the remaining balance if the sale price was insufficient to cover the loan balance. Instances of such actions were uncommon, likely because of perceived litigation costs and the resulting payment delays. These costs would be magnified during a panic.
Similar to the present day margin lending, a transaction involving call loans could originate with money brokers (located anywhere in the country), banks, or on the New York Stock Exchange. Each alternative fund source would administer their loans differently. Some might call them in regularly, or others like the New York banks might just roll them over unless otherwise directed. Ultimately, the sources of call loan funds were banks and other intermediaries, and the money broker played the role of loan distributor for banks. 4 In order to lend on the stock exchange, suppliers of funds had to lend through a broker who was a member of the exchange.
In New York City, the national banks developed relationships with brokerage houses and other brokers, and they lent on call through these brokers on the exchange.
Institutions that lent on the exchange were either New York City banks or trusts, or out of town institutions that lent funds through New York City correspondents. In this latter case, the New York City intermediaries (national or state banks, or trust companies) acted as agents in arranging call money loans for the out of town banks, and often the out-oftown banks were required to hold balances with their New York intermediary. The durability of the lender-broker relationship was important between the New York City intermediaries -either as agents for interior banks or as the fund providers --and the brokers that lent the call loans on the stock market. Borrowers could default on a loan if the collateral value fell below 80 percent of the loan value, but they would then run the risk of being shut out of the call loan market in the future. Banks were known to forebear on calling in loans whose collateral value was less than loan's value, particularly during financial crises, hoping that the collateral value would return to normal after the crisis had past.
A unique feature of the Panic of 1907 reveals the concern of the large banks for the call loan market: the increase in loans at New York national banks during the panic. Sprague (1910, pp. 300-1) describes the volume of loans taken over by New York national banks to maintain liquidity in the money markets and the stock exchange:
We have already seen that call loans were particularly favored by both by trust companies and the outside banks. Even in 1873 the clearing-house banks were able to reduce loans of that kind relatively little, and it might be naturally expected that still less contraction would have been feasible in 1907. ….
Among the many lessons which may be drawn from a study of the experiences of the national banks during crises, the entire absence of liquidness in call loans, so far as New York banks are concerned, is the most certain and by no means the least important. Out of a total loan increase of $63,000,000, call loans accounted for $54,000,000; and, furthermore, time loans with collateral security, which are largely of stock-exchange origin, account for another $4,000,000.
The New York banks took over call loans because, as Sprague (1910, p. 302) notes, "Call loans . . . are local New York loans, and consequently the amount of them which must be made by New York banks increases when other lenders retire from the market."
Financial stress arose during the panics of the National Banking Era in 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and most dramatically 1907. During those crises, when system-wide reserves were tight, the New York stock market faced an apparent lack of sufficient credit for call market loans, and the call money interest rate would increase sharply. Figure 1 displays the call money interest rate and the commercial paper rate (each the monthly average of the weekly rates) over the time period 1890 to 1910. Generally the call rate was below the rate of interest paid on commercial paper (and on time), but there were notable sharp upward spikes in the call money interest rate associated with these periods of "financial stringency." 5 These spikes were much higher in the years leading up to 1907.
The volatility of the call loan interest rate in the years leading up to the Panic of 1907 was relatively higher than previously observed, and contemporary observers attributed this to larger fluctuations in the volume of funds available for issue on call. Woodlock (1908) was especially concerned that the direct lending by interior banks on the call market was potentially destabilizing because it bypassed the New York City national banks and thereby hindered their interest in preserving a liquid market.
We know from historical documentation that there was a perception of insufficient liquidity on the call loan market in October of 1907. 6 The behavior of the call money interest rate supports that view, reaching a high of 125% per annum on
October 24, even though very few trades were placed at that price. Under those circumstances, the New York Clearing House banks likely were willing to deal directly with the trust companies (although on terms determined by the Clearing House) in order to prevent panic induced stock sell-offs in an illiquid stock market, despite a history of rivalry and dissention.
7 Griffiss (1925) , Watkins (1929) , and Myers (1931) the long-term market participants whose intentions were to preserve the enduring viability of the call loan market for all participants, brokers and borrowers as well as lenders (Clearing House banks).
II. The Outsiders
The largest source of lending outside of the national banks in 1907 came from the trust companies, state-chartered intermediaries originally chartered to attract time deposits and hold funds in trust. The trust companies in New York City grew tremendously between 1896 and 1907, so much so that by 1907 they were roughly comparable in size to the national banks in New York City when measured by assets or deposits (Barnett 1910, p, 235; White 1984, p. 37; Livingston 1986, p. 139) . In New York State the reserve requirement for trusts was 15 percent, but only one third of that had to be vault cash; the rest could be deposits at banks. In contrast, national banks in New York City faced a 25 percent reserve requirement in the form of gold in their vaults. During much of the nineteenth century the trust companies had been much less competitive with banks with respect to retail payments, displaying only 7 percent of the check clearing volume of national banks. The lower volume of clearings was a justification for why trusts held fewer reserves.
By the late 1890s, however, the trust companies were increasingly competing with banks in attracting individual deposits and banker's balances in excess of required reserves from interior banks. These excess reserves placed with trusts would not count as required reserves for national banks, but they could be used for inter-regional transactions. New York City trusts also often offered interest rates on banker deposits higher than those of national banks, and they were able to do that mainly because they held fewer non-interest earning cash balances. That is, trust companies paid a lower reserve tax because a smaller proportion of their assets was mandated to be held as cash. The balances in excess of required reserves held at trust companies were purportedly put to use in the call loan market, although it is difficult to find estimates of the volume of call loans held by trusts.
As the resources of trusts grew, so did their participation in the call loan market, which is consistent with comments made by O.M.W. Sprague (1903, p. 47) : "By far, the larger part of the loans of trust companies are made against collateral securities. In the call loan market, they compete constantly with the banks, and are said to take a larger proportion of the total of those loans than of time." The trust companies participated in the call loan market both as suppliers of funds directly and as agents of interior bank funds.
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Thomas Woodlock, writing in 1908, expressed the concern apparent at the time about the influence of direct lending by out of town banks on the call loan market.
Although they used New York banks as agents in placing the loans, such loans did not appear in the weekly bank statement of the New York banks. He describes the potential danger as follows:
This practice first attracted attention as a dangerous element in the situation in the summer of 1902. At that time a quiet investigation developed the fact that something over one hundred million dollars was being lent in this way by out-of-town institutions, subject to the call of those institutions. It was a time of considerable stringency in the money market, and New York bankers felt that the existence of a mass of credit of these dimensions not subject to control has within it the potency of disaster…. In December of last year (1906) it was estimated that over four hundred million dollars of money were being loaned in New York City for account of country institutions, over which New York banks had no control whatever. In view of what has happened in the last three months (of 1907) we may be truly grateful that the storm did not break as it might have broken twelve months ago, instead of coming, as it did, after many months of very severe liquidation, during which these direct loans by country banks were enormously reduced (Woodlock 1908, pp. 36-37) .
The President of the New York Clearing House, Alexander Gilbert, expressed similar, concern in September 1908 in his address to the American Bankers' Association Conference:
They (New York Clearing House banks) realized also that a dangerous situation had been created by the large amount of funds sent to New York by the interior banks to be loaned in Wall Street at prevailing high rates, knowing full well that the first indication of trouble would result in a recall of those funds. … Another threatening danger was the large volume of trust company deposits, almost as great as the bank deposits, against which a very small percentage of cash reserve was being carried (ABA 1908, p. 256) .
In contrast to the New York City national banks, interior country banks typically had not considered the "external effects" of liquidating call loans. Bartow Griffiss also notes this concern:
Country bankers realize that the small individual loans which they make in the call money market are practically negligible in comparison with the huge volume of funds which is daily lent or withdrawn from the market. Hence they feel no trepidation as to what effect their withdrawals will have on such a market, whereas in a more limited and narrow market, similar withdrawals, would have a serious effect on the general tone of the market from which they were withdrawn (Griffiss 1925, p. 92) .
Canadian banks were another source of outside lending and had about $60 million lent on call in December 1906; by December 1907 that amount was down to $44 million owing to reductions in New York City. Rather than adjusting domestic loans to maintain reserves, the Canadian banks used call loans as a source to adjust reserves. Jacob Viner notes that this practice led to these 'outside reserves' held in New York fluctuating much more than reserves held in Canada (Viner 1924, p. 177) . Leonard Watkins notes that withdrawals of funds from the call loan market by Canadian banks in 1907 "added to the difficulties of New York banks during this period" (Watkins 1929, pp. 30-31) .
III. New Estimates of Call Loans.
Identifying who was lending on the call loan market in New York remains a problem. Call loans aggregated across all US national banks in August 1907 showed $832 million out of total loans of $4,678 million, just over 15 percent of all national bank loans as call loans (See Table 1 ). 10 The New York national banks provided $252 million in call loans (U.S. Comptroller, 1907, p. 166-7) . The amount of loans on call at the New York Stock Exchange, however, was much larger than the funds directly contributed by the New York City national banks. Also, the 'total' numbers reflect call loan exposure of national banks, and so they do not include funds placed in the call market directly by New York City trust companies, the funds from interior state-chartered banks, or from private banks. Also, it is likely that the state banks and some interior national banks used a New York City trust company as its agent for issuing call loans.
Unlike the federal funds market, the actual size of the call loan market is hard to determine, as there was no specific agency monitoring it and collecting information on In testimony before the Pujo Commission Hearings, several lenders on the call loan market state clearly that there were few records of the volume of lending on call at the New York Stock Exchange. Charles Turner, the lending agent for National City Bank on the Stock Exchange testified that much lending was done directly between banks and brokers over the telephone, bypassing the money post altogether. This made the volume of lending on call difficult to determine (Pujo Hearings, p. 755). J.H. Griesel, a broker specializing in lending money on call for banks and trust companies, gave similar testimony (Pujo Hearings pp. 747-48).
For 1907 we can only guess at the volume of loans on call by banks and trusts in New York. The actual figures in Table 2 for August, 1907 are the volume of all collateralized loans held by banks and trust companies, which includes collateralized loans on time as well as on call (Moen and Tallman 1992, pp. 622-24) . H. Peers Brewer, however, presents evidence that suggests trust companies held a percentage of loans as call loans that was comparable to that of the national banks (Brewer 1986, p. 143 Table 2 . It also presents a breakdown of call loans into those made for out of town correspondents as well as those made on own account. The figures show that the activity of out of town lenders did not slow down after 1908, increasing more quickly than that of the New York banks. The volume of call loans at the trust companies fell dramatically after the panic, while they continued to grow at the national banks. As the panic focused on the trusts, this is not surprising. The increase in correspondent loans as seen in the Pujo Commission data came mainly from the national banks that reported to the commission. The trusts that reported correspondent loans reported much smaller volumes than did the banks. The correspondent call loans of the national banks appear to have replaced trusts company loans on their own account.
Whether this indicates that the national banks intentionally took business away from the trusts or that they just stepped in to fill a gap left by the trusts weakened after the panic is not certain. Nevertheless, The call loan market was not reined in after the 1907 panic, despite the obvious instability it inserted into the New York financial markets.
In summary, contemporary claims suggest that the call market became increasingly volatile because interior banks and New York City trust companies were placing their funds on call directly. Interior banks using trust companies as correspondents and the trust companies placing their own call loans bypassed the New York City national banks and the Clearing House, exerting a distinct influence on call market interest rates and loan volumes. As a result, the trust companies broke down the dominance of New York Clearing House in the call loan market, free riding on the coinsurance arrangements among New York Clearing House banks. More importantly, the trusts failed to take into account the systemic costs of their contracting the aggregate amount of call loans and the external effects on the financial system during a crisis.
During previous panics the national banks worked through their Clearing House to issue liquidity to the call loan market. The increasing participation of outsiders, however, had weakened the ability of the New York national banks to protect the call loan market and stem panics. Sprague, Woodlock, Myers, and Warburg accurately described the threat to the call loan market coming from the trusts and other lenders. By 1907 the big six New York national banks, which were lending almost two-thirds of the funds lent by the New York national banks on the call loan market (Myers, 1931, p. 271), were no longer able to control the call loan market. But contemporary observers missed the point that even though the big six could discipline the membership of the Clearing
House through reserve requirements and regular balance sheet examinations, they could not control who was lending on the call loan market because membership in the Clearing
House was not universal and not a requirement for lending on call.
IV. Call Loans as Reserves
The call loan market was not an ideal structure for holding reserves in the short run, but given the institutional arrangements of the National Banking system it was likely a reasonable arrangement in the absence of a rediscount market for commercial paper.
The New York Clearing House had no direct authority over the call market. Banks with excess reserves could readily park them in the call loan market. But banks desiring to increase reserves or 'borrow' reserves were limited to the volume of call loans they could liquidate; they could not directly borrow funds through the call loan market. Banks and individuals with hundreds of millions in call loans at their disposal could not save those that were drowning. As already mentioned, without a central reserve organization and without an elastic note issue, one bank could only strengthen itself by weakening another, and any attempt to call in funds from a debtor would only throw him into desperate confusion and set in motion a chain of further embarrassments and insolvencies. (Warburg 1930 , Volume I, page 21).
A less well-known contributor to the central bank movement, Victor Morawetz, also noted the role of the call loan market in spreading the credit problems during the Panic of 1907. "Each bank that has loaned money on call assumes that, in case of need, it can strengthen its reserve by calling such loans; but it fails to consider that, generally, when a loan is called the borrower is obliged to borrow the same sum from some other bank, although a high rate of interest may be enacted, and, therefore, that call loans affect the security of the entire bank situation practically to the same extent as time loans." (Morawetz 1909, pp. 48-49.) The call loan market under normal conditions could have loans rearranged to meet bank specific liquidity needs. Under a systemic increase in the demand for cash or liquidity, the call loan market could not produce a net increase in liquidity. While the deficit at the end of the clearing process. This was a precursor to the modern federal funds market (Cannon 1908; pp. 232-3 and 276) .
Clearing House banks could issue clearinghouse loan certificates to increase cash available to panicked depositors, this mechanism was apparently limited in coverage. 13 The disruption from outside lenders during the Panic of 1907 revealed the risks of linking, however inadvertently, the payments system to capital markets. Before 1907 the New York Clearing House banks had been the important intermediaries for coordinating the payments system; indirectly they served as key intermediaries for capital allocation through the call loan market. A key feature of subsequent central banking proposals was a common opposition to the call loan market as a secondary source of liquidity for the US financial system. This was an attempt to limit the connection between the payment system and capital markets. In earlier panics, the New York Clearing House banks had sufficient resources to maintain liquidity on the call market while suspending convertibility of deposits into currency in the payment system. The diminishing relative size, and hence, influence of the New York Clearing House banks weakened their ability to offset the risks faced by the financial system during the Panic of 1907, both in the call market and in secondary effects to the payments system. The banks may have recovered some influence over the call market after the panic, but a source of reserves outside of the call loan market did not appear until seven years later when the Federal Reserve System was founded. 
